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Abstract
We propose a method for obtaining joint probabilistic projections of migration rates
for all countries, broken down by age and sex. Joint trajectories for all countries are
constrained to satisfy the requirement of zero global net migration. We evaluate our
model using out-of-sample validation and compare point projections to the projected
migration rates from a persistence model similar to the method used in the United
Nations’ World Population Prospects, and also to a state of the art gravity model.
We also resolve an apparently paradoxical discrepancy between growth trends in the
proportion of the world population migrating and the average absolute migration rate
across countries.
Keywords: Autoregressive model, Bayesian hierarchical model, Gravity model, Markov
chain Monte Carlo, Persistence model, World Population Prospects.
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Figure 1: Probabilistic Projections of Net International Migration Rates: 80% and 95%
prediction intervals for four countries, with example trajectories included in gray.
1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a method for probabilistic projection of net international migration
rates. Our technique is a simple one that nonetheless overcomes some of the usual difficul-
ties of migration projection. First, we produce both point and interval estimates, providing
a natural quantification of uncertainty. Second, since our model uses only demographic
variables as inputs, we can make long-term projections without explosion in the degree of
uncertainty. Third, simulated trajectories from our model satisfy the common sense require-
ment that worldwide net migration sum to zero for each sex and age group. Fourth, our
projected trajectories approximately replicate the observed frequency of countries switching
between positive and negative net migration. Lastly, we sidestep the difficulty in projecting
a complete large matrix of pairwise flows by instead working directly with net migration
rates. Sample projections from our model for several countries are given in Fig. 1.
We also highlight an apparent paradox in the evolution of migration trends over time.
We provide an explanation for this paradox and show that our model successfully reproduces
it.
In the remainder of Section 1, we provide background and describe global trends in
migration rates. In Section 2, we describe our data and methods for producing probabilistic
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projections. Section 3 summarizes our main results, including an evaluation of our model’s
performance and what our projections predict about future global migration trends. Finally,
Section 4 contains evaluative discussion.
1.1 Motivation and background
There is a clear demand for migration projections. Organizations including the United
Nations and the UK Office for National Statistics have identified a necessity for migration
forecasts (United Nations Population Division, 2011; Wright, 2010).
Our work is motivated by the needs of the UN Population Division in producing prob-
abilistic population projections for all countries. The UN has recently adopted a Bayesian
approach to projecting the populations of all countries as the basis for its official medium
projection, and has issued probabilistic projections on an experimental basis (Raftery et al.,
2012; United Nations Population Division, 2013), The underlying method can account for
uncertainty about fertility and life expectancy though Bayesian hierarchical models (Alkema
et al., 2011; Raftery et al., 2013). However, the approach does not yet take account of uncer-
tainty about international migration. Instead the UN probabilistic population projections
are conditional on deterministic migration projections that essentially amount to assuming
that current migration rates will continue into the future in the medium term. To make
the method fully probabilistic would require probabilistic projections of net international
migration for all countries.
Lutz and Goldstein (2004), in answering the question of how to deal with uncertainty in
population forecasting, point to the need for simple approaches to probabilistic forecasting
of migration. Our paper attempts to meet this need. Despite the demand, some experts
have been pessimistic about the possibility of predicting migration at all. ter Heide (1963)
felt that the task of finding a usable model for migration is “virtually impossible”. This
opinion was updated by Bijak and Wi´sniowski (2010), who drew the similarly disheartening
conclusions that “migration is barely predictable” and “forecasts with too long horizons are
useless.”
Nevertheless, there have been efforts to forecast international migration. These at-
tempts have mostly been limited in geographic and/or chronological scope. Bijak and
Wi´sniowski (2010) produced migration projections for seven European countries until 2025
using Bayesian hierarchical models. Using another geographically focused method, Fertig
and Schmidt (2000) projected migration flows from a set of 17 mostly European countries to
Germany over the 1998-2017 time period. One drawback of these approaches in the context
of population projections for all countries is that both require the use of data on migration
flows between pairs of countries. Estimates of reasonable quality of these flows are now
2
available for most pairs of European countries (Abel, 2010), making such techniques feasible
for Europe and other developed regions. Estimates for global pairwise migration flows are
also available (Abel, 2013), but the quality of these estimates varies with the reliability of
record keeping in the countries involved.
Another forecasting method was provided by Hyndman and Booth (2008), who gave
a stochastic model for indirect migration forecasting by forecasting fertility and mortality,
taking migration to be the appropriate quantity to satisfy the balancing equation. Their
method provides estimates for individual countries, but joint estimates for all countries
would in general not satisfy the requirement that worldwide net migration be zero. A
simpler approach is taken by the United Nations World Population Prospects (2013), which
includes point projections that generally project migration rates to persist at or near current
levels for the next couple of decades and drop deterministically to zero in the long horizon.
Finally, Cohen (2012) provides a method for point projections of migration counts for all
countries using a gravity model.
1.2 Theory of International Migration
There is a general consensus about the major causes of international migration. On the
individual level, desire to migrate is caused in large part by economic factors (Esipova et al.,
2011; Massey et al., 1993). Refugee movements may be precipitated by political or social
factors rather than economic ones (Richmond, 1988). However, both economic and political
factors are unlikely to be predictable in the long run with any useful degree of certainty.
For the purposes of projection, Kim and Cohen (2010) argue for the use of more predictable
demographic variables in place of unpredictable economic ones. They propose a model for
prediction of migration flows which incorporates life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and
potential support ratio as predictor variables. Kim and Cohen find these variables to be sig-
nificant predictors of migration flows. Furthermore, as demographic variables tend to change
much more slowly than economic or political ones, it is often possible to project the values
of demographic variables decades into the future with a lower degree of uncertainty. Our
model projects net migration rates on the basis of only past migration rates and projected
populations for all countries, for which forecasts can be made with enough precision to be
useful.
One further demographic variable of interest in modeling migration is age structure. Age
structure is important to migration modeling in two different ways. First, projected age
structures for all countries can potentially be used as predictor variables in projections of
future migration. Since labor migration is common, the age structure of the sending and/or
receiving countries can be used in making projections (Fertig & Schmidt, 2000; Hatton &
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Williamson, 2002, 2005). Kim and Cohen (2010), in a study of pairwise migration flows,
found that a young age structure in the country of origin is associated with high migration
flows, while a young age structure in the country of destination is associated with low flows.
Second, it may be of interest to project not only net migration rates, but also age-specific
net migration rates. Rogers and Castro (1981) provided a parametric multiexponential model
migration schedule which can be used in converting from projected net migration rates to
age-specific rates. Their model incorporates a principal migration peak among young adults,
who often migrate for reasons of economics, marriage, or education, as well as a secondary
childhood peak for the children of those young adult migrants. They include a further
option for waves of retirement and post-retirement migration which are common patterns of
regional migration but less common internationally. Raymer and Rogers (2007) point out
the complication that the age structure of a migrating population is dependent on direction
of migration. For example, we would expect a labor migration and a subsequent return
migration to have different age structures. This fact is unfortunately difficult to incorporate
into a model like ours which works with net rates rather than gross pairwise flows.
For projection purposes, Bayesian modeling is well suited to modeling international mi-
gration. The difficulty in making accurate point projections emphasizes the need for an ap-
proach that produces estimates of uncertainty. As our data set includes only 12 time points
per country, non-Bayesian inference could be difficult; the Bayesian approach alleviates this
by allowing us to borrow strength across countries. Studies with limited geographical scope
confirm this intuition. In a comparison of several methods for forecasting migration to Ger-
many, Bru¨cker and Siliverstovs (2006) found performance of a hierarchical Bayes estimator
to be superior to that of a simpler OLS estimator. Good results have also come out of
Bayesian forecasting efforts for fertility and mortality (Alkema et al., 2011; Lalic & Raftery,
2012; Raftery et al., 2012, 2013). In addition to forecasting, estimation of demographic
variables also lends itself to Bayesian methodology (Abel, 2010; Congdon, 2010; Wheldon et
al., 2013).
1.3 Migration trends
The primary goal of our model is to produce point and interval projections. However, it is also
desirable for our model to replicate current trends in the migration data. When looking at
migration trends over roughly the last 60 years, we find an apparent contradiction. Consider
the question of whether migration increased between 1950 and 2010. One sensible way to
answer this question is to look at the number of individuals migrating within each five-year
time period per thousand individuals of the world population. We will denote this quantity
4
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Figure 2: Global Trends in International Migration: Left: Time series of the estimated
proportion of the world population migrating. Right: Average absolute migration rate,
averaged across all countries at each time point. Both plots show number of migrants per
thousand population. The red lines are ordinary least squares regression lines.
by prop(t).1 The left panel of Fig. 2 shows the trend in prop(t) over the period from 1950
to 2010. There is a clear upward trend, with 74% growth in prop(t) between the 1950 time
period and the 2005 time period. This growth is significant. A t-test shows strong evidence
of non-zero slope (p = 0.00087, R2 = 0.69).
On the other hand, we might answer the question of whether migration is increasing over
time at the country level rather than the global level. We can do so by computing the mean
absolute migration rate, mamr(t), averaged across all countries. The right panel of Fig. 2
shows this trend over the period from 1950 to 2010. Whereas there was clear growth in
prop(t) over this time period, mamr(t) shows a much smaller amount of growth, with only
13% growth between the 1950 time period and the 2005 time period. A t-test does not show
evidence of non-zero slope (p = 0.74, R2 = 0.00005).
Thus, there is an apparent contradiction: How is it possible that more people are migrat-
ing than in the past but countries’ migration rates are not increasing on average? In Section
3.2 we resolve this paradox.
A second feature of the historical migration data to consider is the frequency with which
countries switch between being net senders and net receivers of migrant. Such switches have
1To calculate this quantity, we used data that take the form of net numbers of migrants per country
rather than gross counts. We made the approximation that most countries are either purely senders or
purely receivers, so that gross numbers can be approximated by net numbers. For our purposes, what is
important is that this approximation not become much better or worse over time.
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been relatively common over the past 50 years. In fact, in the 2005-2010 time period, 46%
of countries had different migration parity than they had in 1955-1960 (i.e., they switched
either from net senders to net receivers or vice versa.) In contrast, the current United Nations
methodology (United Nations Population Division, 2013) projects no crossovers between now
and 2100. Our model projects crossover behavior that is more in line with historical trends.
Further analysis of projected parity changes is given in Section 3.3.1.
2 Methods
2.1 Data
We use data from the 2010 revision of the United Nations Population Division’s biennial
World Population Prospects (WPP) report (United Nations Population Division, 2011).
WPP reports contain estimates of countries’ past age- and sex-specific fertility, mortality
and net international migration rates, as well as projections of future rates.
The quantity we are interested in forecasting is rc,t, the net annual migration rate for
country c in time period t, reported in units of migrants per thousand individuals in the
WPP data. For calculations, we sometimes convert rates rc,t to corresponding counts yc,t.
Our method also requires knowledge of the average population of countries, nc,t, indexed by
country and time, and projections of nc,t into the future for all countries.
2.2 Probabilistic Projection Method
Our technique is to fit a Bayesian hierarchical first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), model to
net migration rate data for all countries. We model the migration rate, rc,t, in country c and
time period t as
(rc,t − µc) = φc(rc,t−1 − µc) + εc,t,
where εc,t is a normally-distributed random deviation with mean zero and variance σ
2
c . We
put normal priors on each country’s theoretical equilibrium migration rate µc, and a uni-
form prior on the autoregressive parameter φc. Under this model, simulation of trajectories
requires us to estimate or specify values of µc, φc, and σ
2
c for all countries, so the complete
parameter vector is given by θ = (µ1, . . . , µC , φ1, . . . , φC , σ
2
1, . . . , σ
2
C), where C is the number
of countries.
The full specification of the model, including prior distributions, is as follows:
Level 1
{
(rc,t − µc) = φc(rc,t−1 − µc) + εc,t
εc,t
ind∼ N(0, σ2c )
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Level 2

φc
iid∼ U(0, 1)
µc
iid∼ N(λ, τ 2)
σ2c
iid∼ IG(a, b)
Level 3

a ∼ U(1, 10)
b|a ∼ U(0, 100(a− 1))
λ ∼ U(−100, 100)
τ ∼ U(0, 100),
where X ∼ N(µ, σ2) indicates that the random variable X has a normal distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2 (and hence standard deviation σ), U(c, d) denotes a uniform distri-
bution between the limits c and d, and IG(a, b) denotes an inverse gamma distribution with
probability density function (as a function of x) proportional to x−a−1e−b/x.
We obtain draws from the posterior distributions of all parameters using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo methods. In our implementation, we use the Just Another Gibbs Sampler
(JAGS) software package for Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations (Plummer, 2003).
Having obtained a sample (θ1, . . . ,θN) of draws from the joint distribution of the param-
eters, we use these draws to obtain a sample from the joint posterior predictive distribution.
For each sampled point θk from the joint posterior distribution of the parameters, we first
simulate a set of joint trajectories r˜
(k)
c,t for net migration rates at time points until 2100,
where k indexes the trajectory. However, this procedure generally produces trajectories
which are impossible in that they give nonzero global net migration counts. We therefore
create corrected net migration rate trajectories r˜
∗(k)
c,t , using the following method:
1. On the basis of the parameter vector θk, project net migration rates for all countries a
single time point into the future. Denoting the next time period in the future by t′, this
allows us to obtain a collection of (uncorrected) projected values r˜
(k)
c,t′ for all countries c.
2. Convert net migration rate projections r˜
(k)
c,t′ to net migration count projections y˜
(k)
c,t′ . This
is done by multiplying by a projection of each country’s population, n˜c,t′ . We obtain these
projections from WPP 2010 (United Nations Population Division, 2011).
3. Further break down migration counts by age a and sex s to obtain estimates of net male
and female migration counts for all countries and age groups, y˜
(k)
c,t′,a,s. This is done by
applying projected model migration schedules to all countries. We take each country’s
age- and sex-specific migration schedule to be the same as the distribution of migration
by age and sex in the most recent time point for which detailed data were available for
that country.
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4. For each simulated trajectory, within each age and sex category, apply a correction to
ensure zero worldwide net migration. The correction we apply redistributes any overflow
migrants to all countries, in proportion to their projected populations. Specifically, take
the corrected migration count projection y˜
∗(k)
c,t′,a,s to be
y˜
∗(k)
c,t′,a,s = y˜
(k)
c,t′,a,s −
n˜c,t′∑C
j=1 n˜j,t′
C∑
j=1
y˜
(k)
j,t′,a,s.
5. Convert the corrected age- and sex-specific net migration counts y˜
∗(k)
c,t′,a,s back to corrected
net migration rates r˜
∗(k)
c,t′ by disaggregating and converting counts to rates.
6. Continue projecting trajectories one time step at a time into the future by repeating steps
1-5.
Note that, although the uncorrected net migration rates r˜c,t′ come from the desired
marginal posterior predictive distributions, the correction in step 4 changes those distribu-
tions by projecting them onto a lower dimensional space. Sensitivity analysis suggests that
the correction introduces only minor changes between the marginal distributions with and
without the correction.
3 Results
3.1 Evaluation
We do not know of any other model that produces probabilistic projections of all countries’
migration rates. However, we can take our model’s median projections to be point projections
and compare them with models that produce point projections only. First, as a baseline for
comparison, we evaluate them against the simple persistence model which projects migration
rates to continue at the most recently observed levels indefinitely into the future. In the
short to medium horizon, the persistence model is similar to the expert knowledge-based
projections in the WPP (United Nations Population Division, 2011).
Second, we compare against point projections produced separately for all countries using
the gravity model based method of Cohen (2012). The gravity model produces projected
migration counts, but we convert these to rates for comparability with our method. For each
country c, the gravity model makes projections as follows: Let L(t) be the population of
country c at time t, and let M(t) be the population of the rest of the world at time t. Then
expected in-migration to country c is given by a×L(t)αM(t)β, where a is a country-specific
proportionality constant. The exponents α and β are constant across countries, with values
8
estimated by Kim and Cohen (2010). Similary, expected out-migration from country c has
the form b×L(t)γM(t)δ, where b is to be estimated and γ and δ come from Kim and Cohen
(2010). The constants of proportionality a and b for each country are chosen to minimize
the sum of squared deviations between estimates of net migration produced by the gravity
model and true historical values of net migration from the WPP 2010 revision (United
Nations Population Division, 2011). Having estimated a and b for a particular country, net
migration projections are then given by a × L(t)αM(t)β − b × L(t)γM(t)δ, where L(t) and
M(t) are now projected populations. Implementation details are given in the appendix.
Our historical data consist of a series of migration rates rc,t for 197 countries at 12 time
points in five-year time intervals, spanning the period from 1950 to 2010. We performed an
out-of-sample evaluation by holding out the data from the m most recent time points for
all countries and producing posterior predictive distributions on the basis of the remaining
(12 − m) time points. As point forecasts we used the median of the posterior predictive
distribution. We report out-of-sample mean absolute error as a measure of the quality of
point forecasts, and interval coverage as a measure of quality of our interval predictions.
Table 1 contains these evaluation metrics for our Bayesian hierarchical model and the
mean absolute errors for the persistence and gravity models. Across the board, our point
projections outperformed both the persistence model and the gravity model, and our interval
projections achieved reasonably good calibration.
Table 1: Predictive Performance of Different Methods: Mean absolute errors (MAE) and
prediction interval coverage for our Bayesian hierarchical model, the gravity model, and the
persistence model.
Validation time period Model MAE 80% Cov. 95% Cov.
5 years
Bayesian 3.24 91.4% 96.4%
Gravity 4.70 — —
Persistence 3.57 — —
15 years
Bayesian 4.76 84.9% 93.4%
Gravity 6.57 — —
Persistence 6.74 — —
30 years
Bayesian 5.12 77.2% 89.3%
Gravity 12.32 — —
Persistence 7.17 — —
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3.2 Paradox Resolution
In this section, we resolve the apparent paradox that migration rates have been roughly con-
stant when averaged across countries despite growing numbers of global migrants over time.
We first provide an algebraic explanation for how the proportion of the world population
migrating, prop(t), can grow over time while the mean absolute migration rate, mamr(t),
stays roughly constant. We then check that this algebraic explanation is consistent with the
observed data.
We are interested in the change in two numbers over time: the mean absolute migration
rate,
mamr(t) =
∑C
c=1 |rc,t|
C
,
and the proportion of the world’s population migrating, defined here as
prop(t) ≈ 1
2
∑C
c=1 |yc,t|∑C
j=1 nj,t
=
1
2
C∑
c=1
|rc,t| nc,t∑C
j=1 nj,t
=
1
2
C∑
c=1
|rc,t|ψc,t,
where ψc,t =
nc,t∑C
j=1 nj,t
is the proportion of the world population residing in country c in time
period t. (The factor of 1/2 is so that migrants are not double-counted as both immigrants
and emigrants.) Thus, mamr(t) and prop(t) are both weighted averages of absolute migration
rates. The former uses uniform weights across all countries and the latter weights countries
proportionally to their size.
The question of interest is how prop(t) can experience steady growth and increase by
74% between 1950 and 2010 while mamr(t) oscillates and grows by only 13%. From a
purely algebraic perspective, there is no inherent contradiction in these two different weighted
averages growing at different rates, so long as some combination of the following two things
is true: (1) the weights ψc,t are changing over time in such a way that growth in ψc,t happens
disproportionately among countries with high values of |rc,t|, and (2) growth in absolute
migration rate is somehow related to country size.
In fact the population-based weights ψc,t do not change much over the period we are
investigating. Countries which were large half a century ago are generally still large today.
In fact, the growth in prop(t) is mostly driven by growth in |rc,t| for the most heavily weighted
(i.e. most populous) countries. Over the time period from 1950 to 2010, we see nearly across-
the-board increases in absolute migration rates among the very highly populated countries.
Figure 3 shows this growth among the largest countries. Orange bars show absolute migration
rates for the 25 largest countries in 2005-2010, ordered from largest to smallest population.
Blue bars show absolute migration rates from 1950-1955.
Of the 25 countries with the largest populations in 2005-2010, 23 had higher absolute
migration rates in 2005-2010 than they did in 1950-1955. This collection of countries covers
10
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Figure 3: Absolute annual migration rates per thousand individuals in the 25 most populous
countries. Labels on the x-axis are three-letter ISO country codes.
a majority of the world population—76% of the world population in 1950-1955 and 75% in
2005-2010. The mean absolute migration rate among the 25 largest countries was extraordi-
narily low in 1950-1955—only 0.42 per thousand, compared to a global average of 4.71 per
thousand. By 2005-2010, the mean absolute migration rate among the 25 largest countries
had grown to 1.74 per thousand against a global average of 5.31 per thousand. Notably,
the mean absolute migration rate among large countries is still much lower than the world-
wide average. Nevertheless, this small growth in absolute migration rates for the 25 largest
countries provides the majority of the increase in prop(t).
The model we presented in Section 2 produces projections that are consistent with the
observed trends in prop(t) and mamr(t), despite containing no assumptions about or pa-
rameters directly tied to either prop(t) or mamr(t). Projections are shown in Fig. 4. We
forecast that prop(t) will continue to grow, leveling off in the long horizon and that mamr(t)
will remain roughly constant.
One way to interpret this projection is as a continued trend towards globalization. A
defining feature of globalization is an increase in transnationalism in general which manifests
itself by increases in cross-border flows of various kinds (Castles & Miller, 2003). The
continued growth of proportion of the world population migrating is therefore consistent
with an increase in globalization. One result of globalization’s characteristic transnational
11
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Figure 4: In black, observed historical data on mean annual proportion of the world pop-
ulation migrating (left; per thousand) and mean absolute annual migration rate (right; per
thousand) for five-year time periods from 1950 to 2010. In red, median estimates and 80%
and 95% prediction intervals from our model for time periods out to 2100.
flows is an increase in homogeneity across nations (Robertson, 1992). In this sense, too, our
projections are consistent with an increase in globalization. Our model is projecting that
net international migration rates among high-population countries will continue to converge
towards those of the rest of the world.
3.3 Case Studies
3.3.1 Denmark
Denmark experienced net emigration through the 1950s, but has consistently received net
immigration since the 1960s. This pattern of changing from a net sender to a net receiver
within the last 60 years is common to many of the European countries, including Norway,
Finland, the UK, and Spain, among others. This serves as a reminder that the global migra-
tion to northern and western Europe which seems so firmly established now is a relatively
recent phenomenon.
Our median predictions for Denmark have the country continuing to be a net receiver of
migrants for as far out into the future as we care to project. However, we also see that the
probability of Denmark switching over to a net sender increases over time. Based on the
history of the 20th century, it seems realistic to include the possibility of changeovers in Den-
mark and other European countries in probabilistic migration projections. Correspondingly,
projections that do not take account of this possibility seem unrealistic.
12
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Figure 5: Probabilistic Projections of Net International Migration Rates: 80% and 95%
prediction intervals for Denmark, with example trajectories included in gray.
The European countries are not alone in having oscillated between being net senders
and net receivers of migrants. As mentioned in Section 1.3, 46% of countries had different
migration parity in the 1955-1960 time period than they had in 2005-2010 (i.e., they switched
either from net senders to net receivers or vice versa.) Our Bayesian hierarchical model
projects 49% of countries will have different migration parity in 2055-2060 than they do
now. This projection is in line with the number of historical parity changes. In contrast, the
gravity model (Cohen, 2012) projects only 29% of countries to change parity by 2055-2060.
The persistence model and the WPP migration projections (United Nations Population
Division, 2013) both project no parity changes.
3.3.2 Nicaragua
Migration rates in Nicaragua have increased steadily in magnitude over the last six decades.
Nevertheless, although our model projects a small probability of continued growth in the
magnitude of the net migration rate, it gives higher probability to scenarios in which mi-
gration rates move back towards zero. In general, our model favors trajectories in which
net migration rates move towards zero rather than continuing current trends of growth in
magnitude where such trends exist.
Statistically, this tendency for migration rates on average to reverse course and tend
back towards zero arises from the hierarchical nature of the model. Specifically, all of the µc
values, which we can think of as the long-horizon median migration rates for each country,
are assumed to come from a common N(λ, τ 2) distribution. As a result, the hierarchical
“sharing of strength” has a tendency to pull all the µc values towards a common center, λ,
which has a posterior distribution with a mode close to zero. It should be noted that while
13
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Figure 6: Probabilistic Projections of Net International Migration Rates: 80% and 95%
prediction intervals for Nicaragua, with example trajectories included in gray.
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Figure 7: Probabilistic Projections of Net International Migration Rates: 80% and 95%
prediction intervals for India, with example trajectories included in gray.
our model’s median projections tend to predict reversal in growth trends, the predictive
probability distributions give substantial probability to continuation and growth of rates.
3.3.3 India
Historically, India has had relatively small net migration rates, on the order of less than 1
per thousand. The 95% prediction intervals from our model are quite a bit wider than the
range of India’s historical data, expanding out to roughly ±3 per thousand.
Statistically, the width of a country’s prediction intervals from our model is primarily
controlled by the error variance σ2c . (The autoregressive parameters, φc, also influence the
width of prediction intervals, but to a lesser extent.) The excess width of India’s prediction
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Figure 8: Probabilistic Projections of Net International Migration Rates: 80% and 95%
prediction intervals for Rwanda, with example trajectories included in gray.
intervals above its range of observed migration history is statistically a result of the hier-
archical “sharing of strength”. Since most other countries have larger ranges of migration
rates, India’s posterior distribution on σ2c gets inflated somewhat to values more in line with
the rest of the world. The same inflation of σ2c occurs in China, which also has experienced
uncommonly small migration rates in the past.
Substantively, this seems realistic given the increasing globalisation we have documented.
As the largest countries become more like other countries in terms of migration patterns, it
seems reasonable to expect that the variability of their migration rates in the future would
also increase to become more like the levels of other countries.
3.3.4 Rwanda
In the early 1990s, Rwanda experienced high net out-migration, followed by high net in-
migration in the late 1990s. These migration spikes were a result of emigration during the
Rwandan genocide in 1994 and subsequent return migration. Outside of the 1990s, Rwanda
had quite small and stable migration rates. This pattern of stability punctuated by large
shocks poses a problem for probabilistic projections: Do we get better performance with
wide prediction intervals which encompass the high migration rates during the shock, or
narrow prediction intervals which reflect the decades of stability around it?
Our model opts for wide prediction intervals in cases like Rwanda. A model which puts
a heavy-tailed t distribution on the εc,t’s rather than a normal distribution would produce
narrower prediction intervals. However, we found that the normal model achieved better
calibration. Section 4 contains a brief further discussion of a model with t-distributed errors.
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3.3.5 The least-developed countries
The United Nations publishes a list of the least-developed countries, with countries classified
as least-developed based on assessments of their economic vulnerability, human capital, and
gross national income (Committee for Development Policy and United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008). A total of 46 countries in our data fall into the
least-developed category. We now consider briefly the projections that our model makes for
these least-developed countries in comparison to all other countries.
In the 2005-2010 time period, only 26% of the least-developed countries were net receivers
of migration, as compared to 43% of all other countries. The least-developed countries had
an average net migration rate of -0.97 per thousand, compared with an average of 2.64
per thousand in all other countries. However, our model projects that this gap in migration
between currently least-developed and all other countries will narrow over time. Key findings
are summarized in Table 2. Over the coming decades, we project growth in net migration
rates among the least developed countries and decline in net migration rate on average across
all other countries.
Table 2: Mean projected change in migration rates (per thousand) among least-developed
countries (LDC) versus all other countries (Other).
LDC Other
By 2020 +0.02 -1.49
By 2040 +0.29 -2.12
By 2060 +0.34 -2.29
4 Discussion
We have presented a method for projecting net migration rates. Our method is novel in that
it provides probabilistic projections for all countries. Furthermore, it satisfies the requirement
that simulated trajectories have zero global net migration for each sex and age group.
Additionally, we observe a paradoxical trend in the evolution of global migration rates.
Although there is more migration than in the past as a proportion of the world population,
countries’ absolute migration rates have not been increasing on average. We resolve this
paradox by noting the tendency of large countries to have small migration rates. Our method
successfully reproduces this pattern, which seems desirable for migration projection methods
in general.
Our model includes the assumption that the random error terms εc,t are independent
across countries and time. That assumption is mathematically convenient, but for many pairs
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of countries we expect to see non-zero correlations. For example, it is reasonable to expect
that if Mexico undergoes particularly high net emigration during a quinquennium, then the
United States will experience higher than usual net immigration during the same period.
Thus we might expect to observe negative correlation between the random errors for Mexico
and the United States. At the same time, it is not unreasonable to expect positive correlation
between error terms in neighboring pairs of countries whose economic fortunes tend to move
together. Such a pattern is observed, for example, among the Baltic states. We attempted to
find an optimal non-trivial covariance structure by constructing a variance-covariance matrix
as a linear combination of matrices whose off-diagonal elements are pairwise, time-invariant
covariates. However, this method offered no significant improvement over the assumption of
independent residuals.
Migration rate data characteristically have outliers. Wars and refugee movements, for
example, produce migration rates which are on a much larger scale than are typical during
times of stability. This suggests that a model with a long-tailed error distribution like
a t distribution might be more appropriate than a model with normal errors. However, in
practice we found that models with normally distributed errors tended to outperform models
with t errors in out-of-sample predictive evaluation. Models with t errors often produce 80%
and 95% prediction intervals that are so tight that they do not come close to covering
the range of observed historical migration rates. Statistically, the root of the problem is
that in models with t errors, large outliers often do not have a large effect on the inferred
scale parameter. Although using t errors often results in models with a high likelihood
of the observed data, high likelihood does not necessarily correspond to good calibration
of prediction intervals or qualitatively realistic migration rates. In our judgment, there is
more value in forecasting distributions with reasonable prediction intervals than distributions
which are likely to assign high probability density to future observations, and so we have
used the normal model thoughout.
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Appendix: Gravity Model Implementation
We implemented a version of Cohen’s (2012) gravity model which projects net migration
counts for five-year intervals starting at 2010 and ending at 2100. Projections are made for
each country independently, with no redistribution step to ensure zero global net migration.
For each country, projections are produced as follows: Let L(t) be the population of country
c at time t (in millions) and M(t) be the population of the rest of the world at time t (in
millions). Then expected in-migration to country c is given by a × L(t)αM(t)β, where a is
a country-specific proportionality constant and the exponents α and β are constant across
countries, with values estimated by Kim and Cohen (2010). Similary, expected out-migration
from country c has the form b × L(t)γM(t)δ, where b is to be estimated and γ and δ come
from Kim and Cohen (2010).
The constants of proportionality a and b for each country are chosen to minimize the
sum of squared deviations between estimates of net migration from the gravity model and
WPP estimates of net migration (United Nations Population Division, 2011) given in units
of millions of net annual migrants. We used the values α = 0.728, β = 0.602, γ = 0.373,
and δ = 0.948, reported by Cohen (2012). For each country, having estimated a and b, net
migration projections are then given by a × L(t)αM(t)β − b × L(t)γM(t)δ, where L(t) and
M(t) are now projected populations also taken from WPP’s 2010 revision (United Nations
Population Division, 2011).
Our implementation appears to reproduce the results in Cohen (2012). Cohen reports the
values of the proportionality constants, a and b, obtained for the United States, and provides
a plot of the projections from his implementation of the gravity model. Using these, we are
able to confirm that our results agree with those from Cohen’s implementation. Cohen
reports a = 3.43×10−4 and b = −8.28×10−4. We find very similar values of a = 3.42×10−4
and b = −8.33 × 10−4. The slight discrepancies may come from having used only three
decimal places of the values for α, β, γ, and δ in our implementation. Furthermore, Figure 9
shows the projected net migration counts for the United States using our implementation of
the gravity model. Our projections appear to be essentially the same as the gravity model
projections plotted in Figure 1(b) of Cohen (2012).
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Figure 9: Gravity model based projections of net international migration counts for the
USA.
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